ABSTRACT Communication assisted by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been regarded as an effective technique for reliability improvement in both military and civilian domains, whereas it also makes the information vulnerable to passive eavesdropping due to its wide broadcast. In this paper, we investigate the secure millimeter wave (mmWave) communication assisted by multiple UAV-enabled relays and jammers, where exist multiple randomly distributed eavesdroppers on the ground. Leveraging the models of 3D-antenna gain and stochastic geometry, new closed-form expressions of secrecy outage probability are derived on the basis of the opportunistic relay selection scheme involving the characteristics of air-to-ground channel, and the secrecy improvement is demonstrated when the relay density increases. In addition, a cooperative jamming scheme, where a part of UAVs transmit the jamming signals, is designed to degrade the qualities of eavesdropping channels and further enhance physical layer security. The simulation results show the impacts of different system parameters on secrecy outage probability and verify our analysis. It's also revealed that there exist the optimal attitude of UAVs, jamming power and density of jammers for achieving the best secrecy performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, with the explosive growth of wireless data traffic, it has been becoming an emergency to develop the high data-rate transmission in wireless communication systems. As a consequence, millimeter wave (mmWave) technique has been emerging as an important solution to improve the data rate of wireless networks due to its sufficient frequency resources [1] , [2] . However, because of the high path-loss and the sensitivity to blockages, mmWave communication links may be interrupted, especially in a complex and dynamic environment [3] , [4] . To this end, operating an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) as relay in the air has been studied for disconnection recovery and system performance improvement in mmWave communication networks [5] - [7] .
Although there are such advantages by adopting UAV-enabled relays in mmWave networks, it also makes the signals prone to passive eavesdropping attack due to its
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wide coverage and the broadcast nature of wireless channels. Meanwhile, taking into account the prevalence of sensitive and confidential information in wireless networks, it's one of the top priorities to provide a secure service in UAV-enabled relaying networks. Conventional upper-layer security method mainly based on computational complexity by using encryption protocols [8] . As a supplement of conventional cryptographic techniques, physical layer security has emerged as a powerful measure to protect confidential information from wiretapping by exploiting the randomness of wireless channel and its impairments, e.g., noise and interference [9] . There are kinds of techniques, including directional antenna [10] , cooperative jamming [11] and relay [12] , having been used to improve the secrecy performance in wireless communication networks. However, the researches of physical layer security in UAV-enabled mmWave relaying networks are few, and there still exist many problems waiting to be solved. For example, if the cooperative jamming can enhance the physical layer security in UAV-enabled mmWave relaying networks and how can we improve it? enhancement in mmWave networks, and it's worth mentioning that the UAVs can be used not only for relaying message signals, but also for sending jamming. In [10] , considering a mmWave communication network, the UAVs are deployed as jammers to confound the eavesdroppers on the ground, and the average secrecy rate in the considered network has been analyzed.
Contrasting to the existing works, the secure communication in the mmWave networks assisted by multiple UAV-enabled relays and jammers is still an open issue. First, by considering the characteristics of UAV communication channels, the opportunistic relay selection scheme subjected to the channel quality of the air-to-ground link between source and relay still waits to be investigated. In addition, how to enhance the secrecy performance in the UAV-enabled mmWave networks by using cooperative jamming is a challenging work.
B. CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, we investigate the secure mmWave communication using UAV-enabled relay and cooperative jammer. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• Considering a ground mmWave network assisted by multiple UAV-enabled relays in the presence of multiple randomly distributed eavesdroppers on the ground, the effect of cooperative jamming on secrecy performance are first investigated. Specifically, the locations of relaying UAVs, jamming UAVs and ground eavesdroppers are modeled as independent PPPs. Then, the opportunistic relay selection scheme are investigated by considering the characteristics of air-to-ground channels for decode-and-forward relay strategy. Furthermore, the jamming UAVs are adopted to send jamming signals for degrading the qualities of eavesdropping channels.
• The closed-form expression of secrecy outage probability is derived in the considered networks without cooperative jamming. Furthermore, by using the tools of numerical inversion of Laplace transforms and Euler summation, a tight approximated expression of secrecy outage probability for cooperative jamming scheme is derived. The Monte Carlo simulations are presented to verify our derivations and reveal that secrecy performance has obvious positive correlation with the relay density, the antenna number and the transmitting power of message signals.
• Analyzing the simulation results, we find that the secrecy outage probability can be improved by adopting higher UAV attitude when the relay density is small, and the result is opposite in large relay density situations. Additionally, the enhancement of physical layer security is testified for cooperative jamming scheme. Furthermore, there exist the optimal attitude of UAVs, jamming power and density of jamming UAVs for achieving the best secrecy outage probability. The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The system model is introduced in Section II. In Section III and Section IV, we examine the secrecy outage probability in the considered system without and with cooperative jamming. Then, the simulation results are presented in Section V. Finally, the concluding remarks are provided in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider secure communication in the UAV-enabled mmWave relaying networks, as depicted in Fig. 1 . The direct link from source (S) to destination (D) is disconnected and the communication occurs via a selected UAV-enabled relay, which is denoted as R. The half-duplex mode is adopted at R. Specifically, S first transmits the messages to R, and then R forwards its received signals to D by using decodeand-forward strategy. Meanwhile, there are multiple ground eavesdroppers distributing around D and locating out of the coverage area of S, meaning that the eavesdroppers only wiretap the information from R, similar to [26] - [28] . The distribution of all UAVs follows a homogeneous PPP U with density λ U , and the locations of eavesdroppers are modeled as an independent PPP E with density λ E . We assume that each node equips multi-antenna, which is modeled by the 3D antenna pattern. Moreover, all UAVs are deployed inside a circular disc of radius X and at the same altitude H [10] . Both the transmission schemes without and with cooperative jamming are considered. For the first scheme, the UAVs can only forward the signals received from S to D. For the second scheme, we divide the PPP U into two independent PPPs R U and I U with densities λ R = ελ U and λ I = (1 − ε) λ U , where ε is the cooperative jamming factor. The UAVs in R U are only used to relay message signals while the UAVs in I U only transmit jamming signals. In the following, we will further describe the model of this paper in detail.
A. 3D ANTENNA GAIN
We assume that R equips with N R antennas, and each ground node has N l antennas, where l ∈ {S, D, E} denotes S, D and eavesdroppers. We adopt a 3D sectored model by considering the UAVs' altitude [10] , [25] . In particular, the directional antenna gain and the associated probability of R and ground nodes (D or eavesdropper) can be given as
where P RE ij denotes the probability that the antenna gain
B. BLOCKAGE MODEL
It's necessary to take into account the effect of blockage in mmWave networks. Considering the blockage effect of air-to-ground links, the occurrence probabilities of line-ofsight (LOS) and non-line-of-sight (NLOS) links are given respectively as [31] p L (r) = 1
and
where r is the horizontal distance from the UAV node to the ground receiver, and a and b are the constant parameters depend on the environment.
C. PATH-LOSS MODEL
Just as [32] and [33] , we use different path-loss laws for LOS link and NLOS link. Let the link be of length d, we can calculate its path-loss as
where and NLOS path-loss exponents. Specifically, the parameters C j and α j (j ∈ {L, N }) are determined with the frequency of carrier wave.
D. SMALL-SCALE FADING
We assume that the small-scale fading for each link follows independent Nakagami-m fading, which has been regarded as a general model of intensity distribution for rapid fading [34] - [36] . (N N , 1 ).
E. RELAY SELECTION SCHEME
For a potential UAV-enabled relay, it must successfully decode the signals received from S. Therefor, we consider an opportunistic relay selection scheme with two stages: 1) We select a set of UAV-enabled relays that the channel capacities of the links from S are above the threshold C th1 , and denote the set asˆ ˆ ∈ U . Each node inˆ can successfully decode the S's messages and forward the decoding messages to D. It's obvious that the density of available relays depends on the distance from S and whether the communication link is LOS or NLOS. 2) Then, we select an UAV-enabled relay which can offer the lowest path-loss to D from the decoding setˆ . According to the blockage and path-loss model, the selected relay provides the minimum length of LOS or NLOS link to D.
In this paper, we use polar coordinate system to facilitate the analysis. Then, we set the coordinate origin at D, and S locate at (d SD , π, 0). After that, for an UAV-enabled relay locate at (r, θ, H ), the distance from R to D can be calculated by d RD = √ r 2 + H 2 , and the length of the link between S and R can be written as
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE WITHOUT COOPERATIVE JAMMING
In this section, we select an UAV to relay the signals received from S and the other UAVs keep silent. On the basis of the above assumptions on the antenna gain, the relay deployment and the air-to-ground channel model, the received signal to noise (SNR) at a legitimate receiver can be given as
where R x denotes the available relay at location x, P t is the transmit power of both S and R x , d ij is the length of the link between two legitimate nodes, and N 0 is the noise power.
According to the system model in Section II, the eavesdroppers are out of the coverage area of S and only eavesdrop the information from relay. In addition, we assume that all eavesdroppers are independent and cannot exchange information with each other [25] . Then, the SNR at the most malicious eavesdropper can be written as
where G RE e is the antenna gain between R and the eavesdropper e, which can be obtained by (3), and d RE e and h RE e 2 are the distance and small-scale fading gain of the link from R to the eavesdropper e.
A. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Prior of the secrecy evaluation, we first give the mathematical preliminaries of the opportunistic relay selection scheme, and the decoding set of UAV-enabled relay is defined aŝ
where γ SR x is the received SNR of the available relay located at x. No doubt, γ SR x is a function of the distance between S and R x , and the probability of containing inˆ also depends on the location of the relay R x . Particularly, the nodes are more likely to be included inˆ if they are closed to S. Also due to the fact that the channels between S and different R x are independent, the available relay setˆ is an independent thinning of the initial process U . Thus,ˆ is an inhomogeneous PPP which the node density is location dependent [37] . Furthermore, we can derive the density of the point process asλ
where step (a) is due to |h SR | 2 ∼ N j , 1 for j ∈ {L, N }, r is the horizontal distance between R x and the origin S, and d SR x is the distance between S and R x .
In order to maximize the receiving signal quality of D, we assume that D associates with the UAV-enabled relay offering the smallest path loss to D. This means that the selected relay is the nearest one in L or N , where j is the LOS/NLOS available relay point process with density of p j (r)λ (x) (j ∈ {L, N }).
Lemma 1: Denoting the horizontal distance between D and the nearest UAV-enabled relay in j as r j (j ∈ {L, N }), the probability distribution functions (PDF) of r j is given as
where
, and ν j (y) is given as
, and T is the number of the cumulative times by using Gauss-Chebyshev integration.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 2:
Giving that D associates with a LOS UAV-enabled relay, the conditional PDF of r L is
where A L is the probability that D associates with a LOS relay given as (14) at the top of the this page, and
. Proof: See Appendix B. Accordingly, given that D observes at least one NLOS UAV-enabled relay, the conditional PDF of r N is
where A N = 1 − A L is the probability that an NLOS relay is selected.
B. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this subsection, we investigate the secrecy outage probability of the UAV-enabled mmWave relaying networks by considering the effect of the most malicious eavesdropper on the ground. Specifically, the selected UAV-enabled relay R provides the lowest path-loss to D, which means that R is the closest LOS or NLOS relay from D. And the PDF of the horizontal distance between R and D is derived detailly in above Subsection III-A Preliminary Analysis. Then, according to aforementioned system model, the eavesdroppers only can wiretap information from the UAV-enabled relay. The secrecy outage probability can be derived as
is due to that the maximal SNR at the most malicious eavesdropper is approximated as µ =
, and j ∈ {L, N } represents that the LOS or NOLS relay is selected.
In order to calculate the secrecy outage probability, we need to obtain the distributions of the received SNRs at D and the most malicious eavesdropper. The PDF of γ RD,j is derived as
where step (c) is due to [38, eq.(8.352.1) ].
Without loss of generality, we only take into account the eavesdroppers inside a circular area, and for simplicity, the radius is also set as χ. Then, the CDF of γ E can be given by
where step (d) is due to the generation function of PPP E [39] , and j (V , x) is given by (19) , as shown at the top of the next page.
Finally, we can obtain the secrecy outage probability in UAV-enabled mmWave relaying networks by substituting (17) and (18) into (16) .
Remark 1: According to (16), we know that the secrecy outage probability is affected by the distributions of the closest horizontal distance between S and legitimate receiver r L /r N , the received SNR at legitimate destination γ RD and the received SNR at the most malicious eavesdropper γ E . From (13) and (15), we find that the mean value of r L /r N becomes small as λ U increases. Then, D has more chance of receiving stronger signals from R, which causes the decline of secrecy outage probability. Additionally, from (17) and (18), we find that the effect of UAV attitude H on the distributions of γ RD and γ E are different. To be specific, for a given λ U which is much smaller than λ E , the received SNR of the most malicious eavesdropper is more sensitive to H than that of D when H is small, and the result is opposite when H becomes large. Thus, there exist an optimal H that provides the best secrecy performance.
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE WITH COOPERATIVE JAMMING
In this section, we further use a part of UAVs to transmit jamming signals for achieving the enhancement of physical layer security in the UAV-enabled mmWave relaying system. Different from (7), the jamming signals create the interferences at D, and the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) seen from D is written as
where 
, m} is the antenna gain between the UAV jammers and D. Specifically, we assume that the jamming UAVs know partial D's channel state information, and in order to alleviate the jamming at D, the UAV jammers adjust the antenna steering orientation to misalign D [40] .
The SINR at the most malicious eavesdropper can be described as
is the jamming signals
received from jamming UAVs, where
Similar to (16) , the secrecy outage probability of UAV-enabled mmWave relaying networks with cooperative jamming can be derived as
where g r j (·) is given as (13) and (15) in Section III but replacing λ U with λ R , F J
is the PDF of γ J E . In the following, we need to characterize the distributions of the SINRs at D and the most harmful eavesdropper.
Lemma 3: The CDF of the SINR at D for associating with a LOS/NLOS relay is given by
where L I D (s) denotes the Laplace transform of the random variable I D and is written as (24) at the bottom of this page.
Proof: See Appendix C. Lemma 4: The PDF of the SINR at the most malicious eavesdropper γ J E is written as
where J j (V , x, τ ) and ϕ j (V , x, τ ) are given by (26) and (27) at the bottom of this page respectively, and the PDF of I E can be obtain as
where D c equal to 2 or 1 with the condition of c = 0 or c
, Re {y} represents the real part of y, and the Laplace transform of I E is given by (29) at the bottom of next page. The estimation accuracy depends on the selection of the values for A, B and C, which are set as A = 8, ln 10, B = 11 and C = 14, and achieving the accuracy of 10 −8 .
Proof: See Appendix D. Finally, substituting (23) and (25) into (22), we can calculate the secrecy outage probability in the UAV-enabled mmWave relaying networks with cooperative jamming.
Remark 2: According to (23) and (25), we find that the jamming signals degrade the channels of both the legitimate link and the eavesdropping links. When the jamming power P I increases, the secrecy outage probability first decreases and then increases. It can be explained that the received SINRs at eavesdroppers decrease as P I becomes large, meanwhile, the effect of jamming signals on the SINR at D is smaller due to the weak side-lobe gains of jammers. But if P I is large enough, the channel qualities of eavesdroppers are too poor, and D is more sensitive to the jamming signals than eavesdroppers. Furthermore, the secrecy outage probability (22) is not a monotonous function of cooperative jamming factor ε. The reason is that there would be more chance to select a better relay to assist the communication when ε starts to increases. But if ε is too large, the jamming signals are not strong enough to degrade the message signals at eavesdroppers. From the above analysis, the lowest secrecy outage probability can be obtained by properly designing P I and ε.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the simulation results are provided to show the secrecy performance of the mmWave networks assisted by UAV-enabled relays and jammers. We consider the mmWave communication operating at carrier frequency 28GHz. The parameters used in the performance are given in Table 1 . In general, we present the Monte Carlo simulations in each figure, which are used to validate our analytical results. Fig. 2 shows the effect of UAV-enabled relay density on the secrecy outage probability when N R and H are different.
FIGURE 2. Secrecy outage probability versus the UAV-enabled relay densities when P t = 30dBm, C th1 = 5, C th2 = 1, and λ E = 1.5 × 10 −3 .
We observe that: 1) For a given λ E , the secrecy outage probability decreases as the density of relays λ R increases. This is due to the fact that D has more chances to associate with a better relay when λ R increases, which means that D can receive stronger signals. 2) In the low relay density regime, better secrecy outage probability is obtained for H = 120m, and smaller secrecy outage probability can be achieved for H = 80m as λ R becomes large. This reason is that due to the random distribution of eavesdroppers, when λ R is small, the quality of the most malicious eavesdropper channel benefits more from small H , which is opposite when λ R becomes large.
3) The secrecy outage probability can be improved dramatically when N R increases from 9 to 16. The reason is that we can obtain larger main-lobe gain and smaller sidelobe gain by adopting more antenna elements, then the gap between the qualities of legitimate and eavesdropper links expands. As a consequence, we can enhance the secrecy performance by using the directional antenna with more antenna elements.
In Fig. 3 , we plot the secrecy outage probability as a function of H for different N R and λ E . The results show that: 1) The secrecy outage probability first decreases and then increases as H becomes large. This is because the quality of the most malicious eavesdropper channel is more sensitive to H than legitimate channel in the low H regime, and it's opposite when H becomes large. 2) When N R reduces from 16 to 9, the secrecy outage probability deteriorates dramatically. The reason is that the antenna gain of legitimate link weakens severely when adopting less antenna elements.
3) The secrecy outage probability is worse for high λ E . This is due to the FIGURE 3. Secrecy outage probability versus the attitude of UAV-enabled relays when P t = 30dBm, C th1 = 5, C th2 = 1, and λ U = 1 × 10 −3 .
FIGURE 4.
Secrecy outage probability versus the transmitting power when C th1 = 5, C th2 = 1, λ R = 1 × 10 −3 and λ E = 1.5 × 10 −3 .
fact that for higher λ E , the most malicious eavesdropper can obtain better wiretapping channel as the legitimate channel remains stable. From the above-mentioned, we can properly design H to achieve the best secrecy performance. Fig. 4 illustrates the effect of P t on the secrecy outage probability by setting different N R and H . Several observations can be drawn as follows: 1) When P t is small, the secrecy outage probability decreases as P t increases. In addition, in the high P t regime, the secrecy outage probability remain unchanged when P t increases. This is because when P t becomes large, the gap between the capacities of legitimate and eavesdropper channels expands. But when P t is large enough, the channel capacities is mainly determined
119736 VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 5. The secrecy outage probability versus the eavesdropper density λ E when P t = 30dBm, C th1 = 5, C th2 = 1, λ U = 1 × 10 −3 .
with P t for both legitimate and eavesdropper channel, which means the gap of their channel capacities changes to stable.
2) By adopting more antennas elements, the secrecy outage probability will become low due to the high antenna gain of legitimate link.
3) The secrecy outage probability changes for different H . The reason is that the sensitivities to H are different for the legitimate and eavesdropper channels. Fig. 5 illustrates the secrecy outage probability versus λ E . The sub-graph (a) describes the secrecy performance without cooperative jamming. To gain more insight, we also give the sub-graph (b) which depicts the secrecy performance with cooperative jamming for P I = 20dBm and ε = 0.8. We can observe that: 1) The secrecy outage probability can be improved by adopting cooperative jamming. This is because the channel quality of eavesdropper can be deteriorated by transmitting jamming signals, at the same time, the effect of jamming on D is slight due to the weak side-lobe gain of jamming UAVs. 2) The secrecy outage probability increases as λ E becomes large due to the fact that there are more eavesdroppers distributing around D when λ E increases, and the channel quality of the most malicious eavesdropper may be better. 3) Using more antennas can enhance the main-lobe gain and restrain the side-lobe gain of UAVs to improve the secrecy outage probability.
In Fig. 6 , we show the secrecy outage probability versus P I for different N R and λ E . The simulation results show that: 1) The secrecy outage probability is not monotonous versus P I . This is because when P I increases, the jamming signals received by D are weaker than eavesdroppers due to that the main-lobes of jamming UAVs don't align D. But if P I is large enough, the channel quality of eavesdropper is too poor, and D is more sensitive to jamming signals than eavesdroppers. 2) The secrecy outage probability can be improved when N R increases from 9 to 16. The reason is that we can obtain better antenna gain for legitimate link by adopting more antennas.
3) The secrecy outage probability becomes large when λ E increases. The reason is that the channel quality of the most malicious eavesdropper will be FIGURE 6. The secrecy outage probability versus the jamming power P I when H = 140m, C th1 = 5, C th2 = 1, λ U = 5 × 10 −4 and ε = 0.8.
FIGURE 7.
The secrecy outage probability versus the cooperative jamming factor ε when P t = 30dBm, P I = 20dBm, C th1 = 5, C t h2 = 1 and λ U = 1 × 10 −3 .
better if λ E increases. In addition, the lowest secrecy outage probability can be obtained by optimizing P I . Fig.7 shows the effect of ε on secrecy outage probability. Several observations can be drawn as follows: 1) As ε increases, the secrecy outage probability first decreases and following increases. This is because when ε increases, the better UAV can be selected to forward messages to D, and the jamming signals wouldn't be too strong. But if ε is too large, the jamming signals are not strong enough to suppress the confidential signals received by eavesdroppers. 2) We can employ more antennas to restrain the leakage of signals and then the secrecy outage probability can be improved.
3) The secrecy outage probability are different when λ E changes. The reason is that different λ E means different channel of the most malicious eavesdropper. Obviously, the best secrecy performance can be achieved by properly designing ε.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated secure mmWave communication by using UAV-enabled relay and cooperative jammer. Considering the opportunistic relay selection scheme, we VOLUME 7, 2019
analyzed the distribution of the available UAV-enabled relays which follows an inhomogeneous PPP. In addition, we took into account that a part of UAVs are used to transmit the jamming signals to improve the secrecy performance. The simulation results show that the secrecy outage probability decreases when the density of relays, antenna number and message signal power increase or the density of eavesdroppers decreases. It's worth mentioning that the secrecy outage probability can be improved by adopting higher UAV attitude in low relay density situations, and the result is opposite when the relay density is large. Furthermore, our analysis shows that optimizing the attitude of UAVs, jamming signal power and density of jamming UAVs can indeed improve the secrecy outage probability. In the future, it's worth to study the optimization design in the UAV-enabled mmWave relaying networks, e.g., the power allocation between relay and jammer.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
In order to obtain the PDF of r L /r N , which is the horizontal distance between D and the nearest LOS/NLOS UAV-enabled relay, we first derive the complimentary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of r L as
where step (e) is due to PPP's void probability, and L (0, y) is the mean number of LOS relays which are closer than y, then the expression is derived as
and we can calculateF r L (y) by substituting (31) into (30) .
where step (f ) follows the Gauss-Chebyshev integration,
, T is the number of the cumulative times, and ν L (y) can be derived as
, and the derivation is due to the Gauss-Chebyshev integration.
Similarly, we can obtain the PDF of r N as (11) for j = N .
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We first derive the probability that the nearest LOS UAVenabled relay is selected, and the detailed derivation is given as (34) at the top of this page. Then, we can easily get
In the following, we derive the conditional CCDF of the distance between D and the nearest LOS relay by giving that 
a LOS UAV-enabled relay is selected, and the expression is given by (35) at the top of previous page. Then we can derive the PDF g r L (y) = − dḠ r L (y) dy as (13) . Similarly, we can obtain the PDF g r N as (15) .
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 3
In the following, we detail the derivation of F J γ RD,j (x), i.e., 
where y (0, t) is derived as (38) at the top of this page, then we can obtain K as (39) , and the step (o) is due to [38, (38) and (39) into (37) .
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 4
In order to calculate the PDF of γ J E , which is the SINR at the most malicious eavesdropper, we need to clarify the distribution of the cooperative jamming signals. In general, the value of f I E (τ ) cannot be calculated directly. Thus, we use numerical inversion of Laplace transform to obtain f I E (τ ), and the VOLUME 7, 2019 relationship is described as f I E (τ ) = 1 2π i a+i∞ a−i∞ L I E (s) e sτ ds. Then we can discretize the integral as a finite series by using Euler summation [42] , and we can approximate f I E (τ ) as (28) . The Laplace transform L I E is given by (29) , and the derivation is similar to Appendix B. In addition, according to the well builded guidelines in [43] , we can achieve the accuracy of 10 −ς when A, B and C at least equal ς ln 10, 1.243ς − 1 and 1.467ς . For example, we set A = 8 ln 10, B = 11 and C = 14 and achieve an estimation error of 10 −8 .
In the following, we first derive the CDF of γ J E as (40) at the top of previous page. Then the PDF f J γ E (x) = dF J γ E (x) dx can be derived as (25) , where ϕ j (V , x, τ ) is given by (27) , and the derivation is due to [38, 
